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TRIANGULATING STANDING 
JAMES E. PFANDER* 
With apologies to Professor Tribe,1 this brief paper explains how one 
might use the triangle (and other geometric shapes) to clarify some confusing 
features of standing doctrine for visual learners.2  While no one can pretend to 
offer a simple account of so vexing a corner of the jurisdictional world, I have 
found that a simple triangle (or two) can help students better understand the 
issues in such familiar cases as Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,3 Allen v. 
Wright,4 Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,5 Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke,6 and Massachusetts v. EPA.7  As 
standing mavens know, the cases generally require the plaintiff to identify an 
injury in fact, and a causal chain that connects that injury to the wrongful 
conduct of the defendant such that a judicial remedy directed at the misconduct 
will redress the injury. 
My first (and simplest) triangle depicts the relationship between three 
familiar parties in standing litigation: a federal government agency (call it the 
Environmental Protection Agency or EPA), the firms that the agency regulates 
(the regulated party or RP), and the public citizens who presumably agitated 
for the adoption of federal standards and will benefit from successful 
regulation (call these folks the “public interest,” or PI).  Diagram 1 depicts the 
situation as follows: 
 
 
 
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.  © 2009 James Pfander. 
 1. See Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957 (1974). 
 2. For general overviews of standing doctrine, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION 57–116 (5th ed. 2007); JAMES E. PFANDER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION 30–40 (2006).  For an overview of learning styles and the importance of teaching 
to all styles of learners, see Eric A. DeGroff & Kathleen A. McKee, Learning Like Lawyers:  
Addressing the Differences in Law Student Learning Styles, 2006 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 499; M.H. 
Sam Jacobson, A Primer on Learning Styles: Reaching Every Student, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
139 (2001). 
 3. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 4. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
 5. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
 6. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 7. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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 DIAGRAM 1 
The first leg of the triangle depicts a first attempt at regulatory control: the 
adoption of regulatory standards by the EPA, perhaps reducing the amount of 
emissions a smokestack industry can release into the atmosphere.  Once those 
standards have been adopted, the EPA can presumably bring an action to 
enforce them; if authorized to do so by Congress, it has standing to sue RP for 
a violation of federal standards (just as the Department of Justice can typically 
bring suit to enforce federal standards against those who violate them). 
As noted, the first leg of the triangle does not usually raise standing 
questions.  But take a moment to consider that conclusion.  Has the EPA 
suffered any injury in fact as a result of RP’s release of pollutants into the 
atmosphere?  Perhaps not; indeed, the interests of the agency and the 
individuals who set policy, including the agency’s head, the scientists, and 
lawyers, seem to resemble those of the public at large.  Crucially then, the 
power of EPA to sue on what might otherwise look like a generalized 
grievance depends on statutory language that confers authority on EPA to 
enforce the standards it establishes.  That, essentially, was the insight of 
Professor Hartnett; Hartnett argued that the right of the government to bring 
criminal prosecutions depends not on any injury in fact to the government, but 
on the customary and statutory power of law enforcement officials to initiate 
criminal proceedings.8  Hartnett’s broader point: that attorneys general, both 
public and private, act on behalf of the public at large rather than to remedy an 
injury in fact to their own legally cognizable interests, and we tend to regard 
statutory authorization as sufficient to enable them to do so.9 
Just as the EPA has standing to sue RP for violating federal standards 
(assuming the agency’s organic statute authorizes such suits), so too can RP 
 
 8. Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States:  How Criminal Prosecutions 
Show that Standing Doctrine is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 
2239, 2251 (1999). 
 9. Id. at 2258. 
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sue the EPA.  Suppose RP contends that the agency has exceeded its authority 
or has set standards that exceed those Congress authorized the agency to 
impose.  Either sort of claim has long supported an action by a regulated entity 
against the agency in charge.  One can perhaps best depict this reality by 
drawing an arrow from RP to EPA, as in Diagram 2 below. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DIAGRAM 2 
Standing thus operates as something of a two-way street; EPA has standing to 
sue RP, and RP can return the favor. 
A somewhat more complicated set of questions arises when one considers 
the possibility that citizens might bring suit against RP directly for violation of 
federal standards.  At common law, of course, individuals could sue to abate a 
nuisance, although the action was available only to those who lived in the 
neighborhood.  One of the reasons Congress chose to create the EPA was its 
dissatisfaction with the existing tools of environmental regulation;10 imagine 
the citizens of New England, for example, seeking relief on a nuisance theory 
from Midwestern firms whose emissions contribute to acid rain.  Still, 
individuals can suffer relatively concrete harms as a result of violations of the 
EPA’s standards.  In Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services,11 
for example, the plaintiffs alleged with some plausibility that they were less 
likely to use a particular waterway for swimming and fishing after learning that 
the firm had been exceeding the terms of its pollution permit. 
The right of citizens to bring suit in such a situation depends both on the 
terms of the agency’s organic statute and on standing doctrine.  Congress 
might, of course, consolidate all enforcement authority in government agencies 
(as in the case of criminal prosecutions) and deny private individuals any right 
to sue.12  If that occurred, then individuals would have to petition the agency to 
 
 10. See S. REP. NO. 91-296, at 4 (1969) (indicating that Congress created the EPA to address 
perceived problems in the enforcement of environmental law). 
 11. 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
 12. See Hartnett, supra note 8, at 2246–51 (discussing criminal prosecutions in this context). 
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persuade it to pursue the claim (in the same way that citizens report crimes to 
the local prosecutor).  Alternatively, Congress might provide that citizens may 
sue to enforce the standards set forth in federal law.  Diagram 3 depicts such 
litigation: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DIAGRAM 3 
To bring such a suit, citizens must still satisfy the standing doctrine.  So, for 
example, an employee may sue her firm for a violation of fair labor standards; 
she would surely have a concrete financial stake in the litigation.  For 
environmental suits, however, the concrete stake may prove more elusive.  
Remember that to establish citizen standing in such a situation, the citizen must 
show injury, causation, and redressability.  In Laidlaw Environmental Services, 
those elements were deemed satisfied by the plaintiff’s stake in a clean river13 
and in the prospect that the imposition of a fine would deter future unlawful 
discharges.14 
Many of the most difficult standing issues arise not from direct litigation 
between the agency and the RP or between the citizen and the RP.  Rather, the 
difficulty arises when citizens sue the agency to compel it to get tough on the 
RP.  Diagram 4 depicts that sort of litigation as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 183–85 (2000). 
 14. Id. at 187. 
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DIAGRAM 4 
Here, the citizens seek to compel the agency to apply a more rigorous standard 
to the industry, or to enforce the law against a particular firm.  We might call 
these sorts of claims “derivative” to reflect the fact that they seek to change the 
behavior of the regulated industry or firm by acting through the regulatory 
agency.  Such suits have sometimes been called “agency-forcing litigation.”15 
A number of famous standing cases involve this sort of derivative, or 
agency-forcing, model of litigation.16  In Allen v. Wright,17 for example, the 
parents of African-American school children brought suit against the Internal 
Revenue Service to compel it to more vigorously enforce the prohibition 
against granting tax-exempt status to private schools that maintained racially 
discriminatory admissions policies.  The plaintiffs invoked their interest in an 
integrated public school system; white parents in the South were pulling their 
children out of the integrating public schools to attend what some called “white 
flight academies.”  On the plaintiffs’ view, denial of exemption would alter the 
behavior of the schools and the parents who enrolled their children in the 
academies; as the loss of a tax subsidy made tuition more expensive (with the 
 
 15. For an account, see John D. Graham, The Failure of Agency-Forcing:  The Regulation of 
Airborne Carcinogens Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 1985 DUKE L.J. 100. 
 16. Diagram 4 also captures the core of the Court’s analysis in such cases as Linda R.S. v. 
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 
26 (1976).  In Linda R.S., the plaintiff sought to compel the state to bring child support 
prosecutions against the fathers of both legitimate and illegitimate children on an even-handed 
basis.  410 U.S. at 615–16.  But the Court found that prosecution would not assure the payment of 
child support to the plaintiff and denied her standing.  Id. at 618–19.  In Simon, the plaintiffs 
sought to challenge the IRS decision to drop its requirement that hospitals provide indigent care 
to maintain their status as non-profits under the tax code.  426 U.S. at 28.  Again, the Court found 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing.  Id. at 37.  The Court said the plaintiffs might need low-cost 
medical care, but they could not show that denial of non-profit tax status would affect their ability 
to secure such care.  Id. at 42–43.  In both cases, in short, the plaintiffs brought derivative or 
agency-forcing claims. 
 17. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
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elimination of advantageous tax treatment for charitable contributions), some 
white parents on the margin might decide to keep their children in the public 
school system. 
The Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing.  As the Court 
explained, the plaintiffs satisfied the first prong of the standing inquiry by 
alleging a deprivation of their constitutional right to an integrated public school 
education.18  But the plaintiffs could not show causation and redressability; the 
Court doubted that a change in the school’s tax exemption would influence the 
decisions of white parents about where to enroll their children.19  Of course, 
the plaintiffs also contended that they were offended by the provision of any 
government support to the private academies.  Here, the plaintiffs argued that 
tax-exempt status conferred government largesse on racially discriminatory 
institutions, thereby causing stigmatic injury to African-Americans.  But this 
proposed injury was dismissed by the Court as a generalized grievance, 
unrelated to any injury the plaintiffs had suffered.  As the Court noted, third 
parties generally have no cognizable interest in the amount another taxpayer 
pays to the IRS. 
A variant of Diagram 4 nicely captures the problem in Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife.20  There, the public interest group Defenders of Wildlife brought 
suit to compel federal agencies to consult with one another about the 
environmental impact of certain overseas development projects.  Defenders of 
Wildlife sued the Department of the Interior, which had recently concluded 
that no duty of consultation about environmental impact attached to projects 
that the United States was helping to fund overseas.  Defenders invoked the 
citizen suit provisions of the Endangered Species Act, arguing that its members 
had studied the habitat of both the Asian elephant and the Nile crocodile, two 
species that appeared to be threatened by the proposed developments.  If the 
development projects were approved without consultation, the projects might 
produce an avoidable impact on habitat.  We can depict the litigation as in 
Diagram 5: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18. See id. at 756. 
 19. Id. at 758–59. 
 20. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
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DIAGRAM 5 
Diagram 5 seeks to convey the notion that the litigation was doubly derivative.  
It rested on the view that required consultations between the Department of 
Interior and the overseas development agencies would lead to consideration of 
the environmental impact of the projects, and that such consideration, in turn, 
would alter the impact of the projects on the species in question.  The Court 
concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to show the requisite injury by 
connecting themselves more closely to the study of the animals in the wild.  In 
addition, a plurality found this chain of inferences too speculative to support 
standing, and it also rejected the notion that the citizen suit provision could 
provide decisive support for standing when the requisite injury and 
redressability prongs of the analysis were otherwise difficult to establish.  In 
the end, the Court refused to give effect to the ESA’s citizen-suit provision on 
Article III grounds. 
The Court has backed away from the broadest implications of the Lujan 
decision in subsequent cases.  In Federal Election Commission v. Akins,21 the 
Court confronted an attempt on the part of a group of voters to compel the 
Federal Election Commission (FEC) to regulate the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC) as a “political committee” within the meaning of 
federal election law.22  The voters sought information that AIPAC would have 
to disclose (lists of donors, contributions, and expenditures) if it were so 
regulated by the FEC.  The FEC opposed regulation, and argued that the voters 
lacked standing.  In analyzing the issue, the Court found that the plaintiffs had 
satisfied the injury requirement by showing that a decision to regulate would 
 
 21. 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
 22. See id. at 13–14. 
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produce information valuable to their roles as informed citizens and voters.  As 
for causation and redressability, the Court found that a decision in the voters’ 
favor could lead the FEC to reconsider its regulatory stance.  Although the 
Court acknowledged that the FEC would retain discretion to decline to regulate 
AIPAC even if the plaintiffs succeeded on the statutory issue, such retained 
discretion did not foreclose a finding of redressability.  Thus, the Court defined 
success not in terms of immediate disclosure of information but in terms of 
altering the internal agency processes in ways that might produce a different 
regulatory outcome down the road.23  It’s fair to say that this focus on the 
pragmatic operation of internal agency processes, rather than real-world 
effects, represents an important shift away from the approach in Lujan. 
Professor Sunstein has made much of the manner in which the Court 
frames the injury in criticizing its standing doctrine.24  Sunstein notes, for 
example, that in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,25 Alan Bakke 
could not necessarily establish that he would have been admitted to medical 
school but for the University’s decision to set aside a block of positions for 
minority applicants.26  The Court overcame that problem by concluding that 
Bakke had suffered an injury to his right to compete in an admissions process 
untainted by racial discrimination.  Sunstein suggests that other plaintiffs might 
work around standing problems by similarly re-characterizing their claims in 
terms that emphasize injuries to fair process values.27  Thus, in Allen v. Wright, 
perhaps the plaintiffs could have avoided dismissal by characterizing their 
injuries as the loss of an opportunity to participate in the desegregation of 
school systems unaffected by the distorting effect of unlawful tax deductions. 
But as the diagram below suggests, Allen v. Wright and Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke differ fundamentally in terms of the nature of 
the litigation.  In Allen, the plaintiffs were engaged in agency-forcing litigation 
as depicted in Diagram 4.  In Bakke, by contrast, the plaintiff sued the 
University directly, challenging its program of racial set-asides.  Diagram 6 
depicts that situation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 23. See id. at 19–26. 
 24. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
1432, 1464–69 (1988). 
 25. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 26. Sunstein, supra note 24, at 1465. 
 27. Id. at 1465–66. 
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DIAGRAM 6 
One can thus distinguish Allen and Bakke in terms of whether the plaintiff was 
suing the wrongdoer directly (Bakke) or was suing an agency to compel it to 
regulate a third party more stringently (Allen).  Careful framing of the nature of 
the injury, as Professor Sunstein suggests, may help more in the context of 
direct litigation (Bakke) than in derivative litigation (Allen). 
One final wrinkle informs standing analysis: whether or not, in a case that 
one might otherwise characterize as a generalized grievance, Congress has 
provided the plaintiff with an explicit right to sue.  No such right had been 
provided in either Allen or Bakke; the decision about whether to recognize 
standing was one the Court had to make without the benefit of congressional 
guidance.  By contrast, Congress had included citizen suit provisions in the 
statutes involved in both Lujan28 and Akins.29  Thus, the striking feature of the 
Lujan decision was its decision to ignore citizen suit provisions in concluding 
that the plaintiffs could not establish the minimum elements of Article III 
standing. 
Beneath the surface of these cases lies a debate over the proper role of 
agencies in a Constitution that imagines only three branches of government: 
Congress, the Executive, and the judiciary.  Diagram 7 depicts the debate over 
the control of federal agencies: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571–72 (1992). 
 29. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998). 
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DIAGRAM 7 
As Diagram 7 suggests, both Congress and the Executive Branch play 
important roles in overseeing the administration of agency policy.  Congress 
controls the purse strings30 and can redefine the agency mission through 
amendments to the organic statute.31  Budget hearings and hearings into the 
proposed confirmation of agency officials can provide a forum in which 
Congress can either nudge or compel agencies to act in line with congressional 
preferences.  Similarly, the Executive Branch and White House have a good 
deal of oversight: the President appoints the top officials of agencies, subject to 
the advice and consent of the Senate,32 and can in many cases direct the 
operation of the agency or department if he chooses to do so. 
Agency capture issues may help to explain why Congress includes citizen 
suit provisions in the laws that create new agencies.  With standing to sue the 
agency if it goes too far, regulated industries have an obvious place at the table 
when the agency officials sit down to fashion, say, environmental standards.  
Who complains if the agency regulates too laxly?  In theory, the task of 
avoiding lax regulations falls to the agency itself, but Congress may worry that 
agency officials have gotten too cozy with the firms they regulate.33  Public 
interest groups may counter the tendency toward agency capture by overseeing 
the regulatory process.34  In this way, the decision of Congress to include 
 
 30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
 31. See Lars Noah, The Little Agency that Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional and 
Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 918 (2008) (discussing how amendments were 
made to the FDA’s organic statute “to make clear” what Congress wanted). 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 33. The Bush-era scandal in the Interior Department provides a defining, if perhaps not 
representative, example of agency officials getting too cozy with regulated industry.  See Charlie 
Savage, Sex, Drug Use, and Graft Cited in Interior Department, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2008, at 
A1. 
 34. See Mark Seidenfeld & Janna Satz Nugent, “The Friendship of the People”: Citizen 
Participation in Environmental Enforcement, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 269, 302 (2005). 
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citizen suit provisions in the statute can be seen as a way of assuring interest 
groups a place at the regulatory table.35  Interest groups can sound the alarm, 
and invite more pointed congressional oversight, if regulations grow too lax. 
Although the Court has generally upheld the power of Congress to confer a 
degree of independence on federal agencies, some scholars have argued that 
such independence violates the Constitution’s insistence on a unitary 
Executive.  Out of the unitary-executive debate has come a suggestion that 
Article III standing doctrine must take account of the separation of powers and 
the role of the Executive Branch under Article II.36  On this view, only the 
Executive Branch can determine how vigorously or laxly to enforce particular 
federal laws.37  The Court has traced this executive power of enforcement 
discretion to the Take Care Clause, the provision in Article II that directs the 
President to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.38  Thus, in Allen v. 
Wright, the Court invoked the Take Care Clause in questioning whether 
citizens can be permitted through litigation to seek a re-structuring of the 
apparatus the Executive Branch uses to fulfill its enforcement obligations.39  
Similarly, in Lujan, Justice Scalia highlighted the Take Care Clause as part of 
his argument that Congress lacks power to invest private citizens with the 
authority to assume the President’s law enforcement obligations.40  Diagram 8 
depicts this strong vision of executive primacy as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DIAGRAM 8 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and 
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 211–12 (1992). 
 37. See id. at 212. 
 38. Id. 
 39. 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984). 
 40. 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1991). 
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Although this is not the place finally to resolve the debate over the Take Care 
Clause and executive primacy in the enforcement of the law, it may not be 
amiss to point out that Congress has long used its legislative power to broaden 
or narrow the scope of executive discretion.41  When Congress narrows 
executive discretion and creates rights, those who believe that they enjoy such 
rights can make a fairly strong argument that the federal courts should be open 
to hear their claims.42 
How then to make sense of the Court’s most recent derivative standing 
decision, Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency?43  Diagram 9 
below attempts to do so: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DIAGRAM 9 
The state of Massachusetts brought suit to compel the Environmental 
Protection Agency to regulate the greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to 
global warming.  In finding that the state had standing to bring the action, the 
Court placed special emphasis on two factors: (1) that Congress had included 
states among those who could bring suit to protect procedural interests, and (2) 
that the state had important sovereign interests to protect (such as the coastal 
areas that rising sea levels would inundate).   In response to the argument that 
EPA’s regulations might have little discernible impact on the Massachusetts 
shoreline, the Court noted that the state’s quasi-sovereign status entitled it to 
special solicitude in standing analysis.  Thus, while the Court continued to 
require a showing of causation and redressability, the standards it applied were 
somewhat relaxed.  Perhaps the addition of a small crown to the depiction of 
the state—a crown that represents its status as a sovereign—would help to 
 
 41. See Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Carter, 62 TEX. L. REV. 785, 789 
(1984) (“Congress can confer more or less policymaking authority on the Executive by legislating 
at a high level of generality or by enacting detailed legislation that leaves very little discretion to 
the Executive.”). 
 42. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 43. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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clarify why this particular form of agency-forcing litigation was permitted to 
proceed. 
CONCLUSION 
Standing doctrine often reflects the Court’s effort to balance the respective 
roles of regulatory agencies, the parties they regulate, and the many different 
publics they seek to serve.   I have found students can keep these complex 
relationships better in mind if they see them depicted graphically on the 
blackboard or in a slide presentation.  By triangulating standing, professors can 
provide visual learners with a stronger grasp of this confusing chapter of 
jurisdictional law. 
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